Last time, I wrote about terms and basic concepts in game theory. This time, I will focus on the assumption and mathematical terms to formulate a game theory problem.
Since game theory is a study of strategy and decision making, the basic assumption in game theory is that every participant (i.e. agent) is rational. Basically, there is no emotion, no irrational behavior, or any human error when making decision. In my opinion, this makes game theory incomplete, because humans are well-known for irrational behavior. Therefore, when one uses game theory, he or she must use it within certain context for pragmatic purpose.
After the rational assumption for decision making, every participant is assigned a function called utility function. The utility function is an economist’s term, which indicates a person’s overall happiness and well-being. In engineering term, the utility function is equivalent to a cost function. Since game theory models the strategic interaction among participants, the goal of game theory is to find a strategy to maximize your utility function and minimize your enemy’s function.
Since the inter-dependence of players is critical in game theory, according to Geckil et al. [1], game theory exhibits a social science corollary to fundamental principles in physics: every action has a reaction. Therefore, there are two ways to model these actions: sequential and simultaneous.
Sequential action: think of it as a chess game. Every player is aware of each other’s action in previous turns. In addition, every player knows that his or her own action will affect the outcome of the game.
Simultaneous: think of it as a rock-paper-scissor, poker, or any game that participants are not aware of each other’s move in previous turns. Though they do not aware of each other in previous turns, they aware of each other during the game. For example, poker players are aware of their opponent’s hands during the game if they do not fold.
To be continued.
Bibliography:
- Geckil, Ilhan K., and Patrick L. Anderson. Applied game theory and strategic behavior. CRC Press, 2009.
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